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Office Memorandum: 2491 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

Executive Director

3 September 1946

FROM

Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch

SUBJECT:

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REEL

Intelligence Remarks of Major General William J. Donovan

Attached herewith are the texts of the talks presented over the Columbia Broadcasting System on Thursday, 29 August 1946, by Major General William J. Donovan, former Director of the Office of Strategic Services, and Major General John J. Mangan, former head of the New York Guard in charge of the military defense of Manhattan. The subject of their broadcast was, "What Kind of Intelligence Service Does America Need."

- 2. Attention is called to the remarks of General Mangan on page 3 of the attached texts.
- 3. Attention is further called in particular to the remarks of General Donovan on page 5 in which he states that he advised the OSS be dissolved as a war-time agency, "but that its assets should be conserved during peace under the guidance of another agency.... There is no real Central Intelligence Agency in which they can serve." General Donovan further recommends on page 6 that experts be gathered together into an independent intelligence agency.

ALTER L. PRUKZHEIMER Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch

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COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

IN MY OPINION

Thursday, August 29, 1946

6:15 - 6:30 PM

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ANNC'R: Columbia presents In My Opinion, heard every Monday and Thursday evening, introducing a variety of viewpoints from people in many fields of interest. This is not news - it's an expression of personal opinion. Tonight's question for discussion is "What Kind of Intelligence Service Does America Need?" And here to express their opinions are Major General William J. Donovan, former Director of the Office of Strategic Services, and Major General John J. Mangan, former head of the New York Guard in charge of military defense for Manhattan. Our first speaker is Major General John J. Mangan. MANGAN: Our national need for a sound and efficient foreign intelligence service is a most timely subject for discussion. The presence here tonight of my old friend, college mate and war comrade of World War I, is sure evidence of this need. General Donovan, as Director of the Office of Strategic Services, laid the ground work during World War II for a peace-time fact gathering organization. An organization that would bring about a correct understanding of other nations' programs and their aspirations. Only by such an understanding can we arrive at world unity and world peace.

Tonight, we are speaking of intelligence in peace-time, as contrasted to war-time espionage. We speak of the type of intelligence that will help build a workable foreign policy to continue the peace. Intelligence work is fact-finding and fact evaluation. If we are to have an effective foreign intelligence service, it should comprise personnel representing a cross-section of the American people, as OSS did in war-time. It should draw on the nation's intellectual resources. It should be accessible to such volunteers as students, missionaries, tourists, labor and business representatives who frequently go abroad. And this heterogeneous group should help evaluate, as

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well as collect data on foreign peoples, their culture, politics, economics, religion, folklore, and costumes. It should have a close relationship, though, to the man on the street in foreign country. Even in our national political parties they make a careful study of the views and the will of our citizens when forming national party platforms.

You may ask, "what of our diplomatic service? Isn't it the job of carefully trained personnel in American foreign service?" Unfortunately, the answer is "no." Diplomats deal with governmental heads and agencies, which may or may not reflect the will of the people. It is the will of the people which alone can sustain a government through the trying and continuous negotiations which constitute world peace.

Foreign Powers have long followed our local (?) and state expressions. They are familiar with our sectional needs and our prejudices. And this is the work of an organization operating independently of their diplomatic intercourses. Consider our handicap in the war with Japan. When the enemy struck at Pearl Harbor, America had only a handful of trusted citizens with the fluent command of the Japanese language. We were unable to determine until late in the war how long the Japanese moral would stand up. We had little information about Japan's capacity to keep on fighting under the impact of our Naval and aerial blockade. And when Japan finally collapsed, we were literally caught by surprise. We were unprepared to proceed immediately with the complicated details of surrender negotiations.

Now it is easy for Monday morning quarterbacks to review yesterday's gains play by play, and to point out mistakes, but certainly in this instance we must take stock of the lessons we have learned. All America is justly proud of the remarkable work which General Donovan and his OSS organization did in the last war. They rendered invaluable service to our

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armed forces all over this earth. And they likewise rendered invaluable service to the President and his cabinet in collecting information and appraising situations all of which helped to correctly form our foreign policy with governments established, or to be established. Unfortunately, the twenty thousand men and women of all races and creeds, who comprise the OSS, have gone back to their way of life. Our representatives, now dealing with the peoples of the earth in negotiating a world peace we fought for, stand alone in their apprehension without the aid of an organization such as General Donovan's OSS. Such an organization should now be working with them in Europe. They sorely need it.

ANNC'R: That was Major General John J. Mangan. Now we shall hear from Major General William J. Donovan.

DONOVAN: General Mangan has described how our war-time intelligence agency was dissolved so that now we do not have an adequate intelligence organization. Before World War II we in America assumed we didn't need intelligence about other nations. As a result, when war came, we found that we were ignorant of what was going on in the world. We had to depend on allied and friendly governments for our information. Even then we were unable to make use of the information we obtained, because the various documents and reports on the enemy were scattered through various agencies of the government and had not been brought together and analyzed to give us the information we needed. Only later, during the investigation of Pearl Harbor, did we find out that in December 1941 we had information, which if properly mobilized and interpreted might well have disclosed to us what Japan intended to do in December 1941.

Just preceding Pearl Harbor, the President had asked me to

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make suggestions at setting up an American Intelligence system. I submitted certain recommendations. The President then established the organization later known as the Office of Strategic Services to carry out these recommendations. This is what we did in that agency: — We collected information on enemy countries; their armed strength; their internal economy; their supply channels; their morale; and their relations with their neighbors. We brought together trained research specialists from the universities, from American business, and from labor organizations. Using the information and material at hand, these men soon made reliable and comprehensive reports for the President and his strategic advisers. We thus began to unmask the intention and the power of the enemy.

Here are two examples of the things we did:— Our economists were able to discover German Army and industrial strength by means of a careful analysis of German officer deaths, reported in German newspapers. We learned what the German production of tanks and combat planes was by examining hundreds of factory plates taken from captured German tanks and planes.

In the OSS we quickly learned that you can't collect all of the information needed in war by sitting in Washington. And you can't deliver your information to the man who needs it from a Washington desk. So OSS headquarters were established in every theatre, in England, North Africa, Switzerland, and Sweden, from which we sent agents and guerilla fighters in occupied France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy — and on the other side of the globe we operated in Siam, China, Burma, and Indo-China. That was an effective war-time intelligence system. Information gatherers and fighters behind enemy lines, and scholars placed all the way from Washington to the Front Lines. Men who could interpret the information received and give it to the official or commander who needed it.

Let me say a word about these men. They were all Americans.

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Many of them are French, Italian, German, Siamese, Chinese origin. But now all Americans. We had often been told by our Allies that this mixture of nationalities in America was a weakness and could be penetrated and exploited by our enemies. But we said and we did convert that so-called liability into a great asset. Only American melting pot could mobilize such a body of experts in the knowledge of other countries, and we did it to the great advantage of our war effort. Now that the war is over, this Intelligence Organization has been disbanded. I advise that it be dissolved as a war time agency, but that its assets should be conserved during peace uder the guidance of another agency, in order to service the country in its present serious problems. But very little was done. Almost all of the Intelligence personnel, with their skills in the languages, economics, and politics of other nations, have been allowed to drift away from the government, as General Mangan has told you. There is no real central intelligence agency in which they can serve.

Our experience in war shows that our American Democratic system has no use for a gestapo, or sinister spies, or for sultry blondes. Neither do we want what General Marshall has called "teacup intelligence" — news picked up by diplomats at dinner parties. We mobilized our information experts in war, and we should do so again in peace—time in order to prevent war. We need an independent, unbiased agency, made up of the best experts we can get together. We need it as an instrument of peace. The soundness of our foreign policy is our hope of peace, and our foreign policy can be no better than the information upon which it is based. Our policy makers, especially in the United Nations and in the Peace Conference, should have the best intelligence we can give them.

They must never again be in the position they were in 1941 — uncertain of the

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exact intention of our potential enemies, and ignorant of the power of our allies.

The only sure way we can do this is to set up the kind of intelligence organization which our experience since the has taught us is really effective. We must gather together our experts into an independent agency. Such an agency can co-ordinate all our information so that we can act independently without bias to serve our policy makers. We must do this, and then we will know what is going on in the world. With this knowledge we can be strong and resolute in safeguarding our nation with a self respecting peace. If we do not do this, we will destroy the first line of defense to our security and to our liberty.

ANNC'R: You've been listening to In My Opinion, a regular CBS series presenting a variety of personal opinions, from people in many fields of current interest. Tonight's guests were Major General William J. Donovan, former Director of the Office of Strategic Services, and Major General Mangan, former head of the New York Guard in charge of military defense for Manhattan. They gave their opinions on the question — "What Kind of Intelligence Service Does America Need?"

This is CBS... THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM.

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